Untitled

SCADA System Open to Google Search

Bad One - misconfigured sites:
http://115.248.75.73/rtu.aspx
http://scada.pln-jawa-bali.co.id/outofpoll.php
http://bops.pln-jawa-bali.co.id/
http://10.6.1.50
http://scada.pln-jawa-bali.co.id/statusts.php
http://80.81.127.209/citect/ – http://81.233.151.96/
http://88.112.77.67/
http://87.94.167.4/
http://87.94.167.5/
http://192.89.118.200
http://217.30.178.82/
http://84.249.121.239/ord?station:|slot:/P$e4$e4valikko
http://132.181.40.6/index.cgi
http://129.79.153.212/index.cgi
http://155.185.12.221/index.cgi
http://80.81.127.209/citect/
http://85.112.163.200/
http://81.233.151.96/
http://213.201.177.254/
http://64.131.88.166
http://221.115.238.179/
http://80.81.127.209/citect/
http://84.249.121.239/ord?station:|slot:/P$e4$e4valikko
http://62.145.177.187/secure/ltx_conf.htm
http://132.181.40.6/index.cgi
http://129.79.153.212/index.cgi
http://155.185.12.221/index.cgi
http://80.81.127.209/citect/ 80.81.127.209” on 80.81.127.209:80. ********
http://85.112.163.200/
http://81.233.151.96/
http://155.185.12.221/
http://115.248.75.73/rtu.aspx
http://scada.pln-jawa-bali.co.id/outofpoll.php
http://bops.pln-jawa-bali.co.id/
http://10.6.1.50
http://scada.pln-jawa-bali.co.id/statusts.php
http://174.122.136.226/~tsoepcg/WEB-SCADA/admin/index.php
The city of South Houston has a really insecure system. Wanna see? I know ya do.
http://i41.tinypic.com/ip0aa0.png
http://i42.tinypic.com/eun021.png
http://i42.tinypic.com/1znptuu.png
http://i41.tinypic.com/2m6o0au.png
http://i40.tinypic.com/k386ep.png
http://www.mediafire.com/file/38m3pvwrc8ckh7s/HMI.zip
http://134.30.92.26
http://77.241.236.100/
http://84.35.1.26/
http://62.132.140.68/
http://86.86.170.62/
http://81.70.183.50/
http://90.145.71.18/
http://77.170.9.159/
http://87.195.149.111/
http://213.84.82.128/
http://213.125.69.122/
http://92.65.96.170/
http://188.203.145.174/
http://92.65.96.170/
http://82.92.163.7/
http://92.68.26.162/
http://213.197.61.146/
http://213.84.223.82/
http://80.126.161.66/
http://188.201.63.161/
http://31.160.203.190/
http://31.160.203.188/
http://213.84.82.144/
http://92.67.47.42/
http://81.205.168.234/
http://188.204.125.49/
http://194.89.33.245/
http://173.247.17.72 12
http://87.195.111.115/Infra-web/Login/Login.aspx?ReturnUrl=%2finfra-web%2fDefault.aspx
http://194.89.33.245/
http://188.204.125.49/
http://77.170.59.44/
http://217.120.152.182/
http://212.142.22.198/
http://129.125.15.55/
http://62.163.194.70
http://188.200.74.43
http://130.161.143.224/
http://87.195.111.115/
http://77.170.59.44/
http://217.120.152.182/
http://178.85.43.105/
http://212.199.70.171/login.php
http://188.64.203.242/login.asp
http://212.235.109.200
http://212.235.68.46/login
http://77.127.51.131/admingui/login.html
http://194.150.219.139/console/login.asp
http://81.218.96.38/login
http://212.199.41.148/Templates/Admin/login.aspx
http://80.250.154.152/login.asp
http://194.150.219.139/console/login.asp
http://192.116.222.44
http://81.137.8.170/file/px/Honeywell%20House%20Metering.px
http://165.154.50.20/ord?station:|slot:/HOME
http://173.181.202.83/ord?station:|slot:/HOME
http://219.90.201.244/ord?station:|slot:/Drivers/HOME$20PAGE
http://124.178.246.152/ord?station:|slot:/Home$20Page
http://203.122.195.160/ord?station:|slot:/Guest
http://81.149.155.83/ord?file:^px/Welcome.px
http://81.149.206.150/ord?file:^px/energysummation1.px
http://81.94.198.175/file/px/Chillers.px
http://81.136.189.235/ord?file:^px/Welcome.px
http://85.189.244.242/file/Graphics/Px/Guest.px
http://188.205.196.6/ord?station:|slot:/MS01|view:MS01hx
http://206.47.97.8/ord?station:|slot:/HOME
http://208.80.99.243/ord?station:|slot:/HOME
http://115.248.75.73/
http://209.130.196.15/water1.htm
209.130.196.15/water1.htm
Keeping Access
TCP/IP MODBUS ethernet.industrial-networking.com/articles/i15security.asp
Traditionally network and security folks have focused virtually all our attention on the “enterprise” side of the network, ignoring the parallel “hidden” half of the network associated with process control systems and embedded systems.
Process control systems and embedded systems use different protocols, different jargon, and no one ever really mentioned them. They were out of sight and out of mind, and “handled” by hardware guys.
port 502/tcp -MODBUS/TCP
http://scadahoneynet.sourceforge.net
www.ethereal.com
SCADA Security Research Opportunities
http://www.instrument-middleware.org
120.124.6.25/broadWeb/bwview.htm

broadwin.com/
Broadwin WebAccess is web browser based HMI and SCADA software for industrial Automation. View and Control in Real-time using an ordinary Web browser.
http://120.124.6.25/broadWeb/
SCADA traffic will be on just one port such as 502/tcp (e.g., Modbus/TCP). This is both good and bad. The use of a single port (or just a couple of …
http://www.robtex.com/dns/rtu.asia.html#records
http://my.epri.com/portal/server.pt?
http://www.pikeresearch.com/research/smart-grid/smart-grid-security
http://www.pikeresearch.com/research/smart-grid/smart-grid-security
http://blog.tenablesecurity.com/2006/12/nessus_3_scada_.html
http://115.248.75.73/rtu.aspx
http://scada.pln-jawa-bali.co.id/outofpoll.php
http://bops.pln-jawa-bali.co.id/
http://10.6.1.50
http://scada.pln-jawa-bali.co.id/statusts.php
http://115.248.75.73/
San Fransisco
http://209.130.196.15/water1.htm
San Francisco Water RTU 12
209.130.196.15/water1.htm
San Francisco Water. Pump Station 12. Rate -Pump 1. Rate -Pump 2. Tank Level.RTU Status. Pump Control /Alarms. MBP Statistics · RTU Home Page.
China :
http://www.echocontrol.com/en_typical/253.asp
RTU for the radio station side, PLC / DCS control room and two in between the fiber
Different sectors of the largest or most complex systems there is a difference, here cite a typical example of SCADA system:
Readiness desert oilfield SCADA system, that is, a secondary instrument to the oil extraction plant control room by a company’s products to complete.
This project is located in the eastern Junggar Basin, Xinjiang, enter Gurban classical and big desert 80Km, sand cover thickness 200m ~ 300m, annual temperature variation of -45 ? ~ 42 ?, the maximum surface temperature of the working platform up to 60 degrees. Field length 16km, width of 8km. IO points at 17,200 points or so, there are two in the control room, 34 PLC station, a DCS station, 478 RTU stations.
This should be the most typical one. Some system of nodes in the one thousand or more, but less IO points.
it “should search all” do
industry = Industry.create(:name => ‘Pickle’)
country = Country.create(:name => ‘Coffee’)
gis = Domain.find_by_name(‘GIS’)
wireless = Domain.find_by_name(‘Wireless’)
scada = Domain.find_by_name(‘SCADA’)
tag = Tag.create(:name => ‘zomg!!!!’)
@org1 = Organization.create(:name => ‘foo org’, :domains => [gis, wireless, scada], :industry => industry, :country => country, :tags => [tag])
@org2 = Organization.create(:name => ‘foo two’, :domains => [gis, wireless, scada], :industry => industry, :country => country, :tags => [tag])
@org3 = Organization.create(:name => ‘foo xxx’, :domains => [gis, wireless, scada], :industry => industry, :country => country, :tags => [tag])
@org1.should be_valid
@org2.should be_valid
@org3.should be_valid
results = {:organizations => [@org1, @org2, @org3]}
params = { :keywords => “foo”, :domains => [gis.id, scada.id, wireless.id], :models => [“organization”] }
put “create”, params
response.should render_template(:create)
flash[:notice_organizations].should_not == “No Corporation Found”
end
port number is 6722
port number is 6722
?????Project Node Project Node????Scada ?????
www.broadwin.com.tw/…/WebAccess_ … - Translate this page
File Format: PDF/Adobe Acrobat – Quick View
URL=http://192.168.200.220/broadweb/bwview.htm. URL=http:/ /192.168.200.220/broadweb/bwview.htm#proj=AHC2001. #proj=AHC2001 …
“SCADA and Industrial Automation Security,” http://www.scadasec.net/
“SCADA Security Blog”
http://www.digitalbond.com/SCADA_Blog/SCADA_blog.htm
“SCADA Gospel Archives (edited archives of the SCADA mailing list)”
“http://members.iinet.net.au/~ianw/archive/book1.htm
“21 Steps to Improve the Cyber Security of SCADA Networks,”
http://www.ea.doe.gov/pdfs/21stepsbooklet.pdf
“Critical Infrastructure Protection: Challenges and Efforts to Secure Control Systems”
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04354.pdf
“Myths and Facts Behind Cyber Security of Industrial Controls” http://www.pimaweb.org/conferences/
april2003/MythsAndFactsBehindCyberSecurity.pdf
Cisco’s “Integrating IT and Control System Security”
http://www.scadasec.net/local/37
modbus.org
protocols:
Ethernet - TCP/IP - Windows - RPC - SMB - 802.11b - HTTP/HTTPS - ASCII- Unix/Linux/Solaris - TFTP- - SQL - OPC - PLC - RTU - ModBus- -IEC 60870 - ICCP - HMI/MMI- S5/S7 - Fieldbus- IED- TASE-2
ANSI X3.28•BBC 7200•CDC Types 1 and 2•Conitel2020/2000/3000•DCP 1•DNP 3.0•Gedac7020•ICCP•Landis & Gyr8979•Modbus•OPC•ControlNet
•DeviceNet•DH+•ProfiBus•Tejas3 and 5•TRW 9550•UCA
OPC-DA, OPC-DX, OPC-A&E, OPC-HDA
Ethernet
SCADA & CS Components
•Sensors and Field Devices
•RTU –Remote Terminal Unit or Remote Telemetry Unit
•IED –Intelligent Electronic Device
•PLC –Programmable Logic Controller
•FEP / Protocol Pre-processor –Front End Processor
•HMI / Operator Console –Human Machine Interface
•PCS –Process Control System
•DCS –Distributed Control System
•SCADA –Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
•EMS –Energy Management System
http://www.elp.com/index.html
form Stephen Scott Wright • presentation Critical Infrastructure attacks, that was part of an old presentation I put together titled “Today was forty years in the making..” note – this is not by any means all of them.
1. – Foreign intelligence service inserts Malicious Software into the Siberian Pipeline SCADA system and causes an explosion with an estimated 3 kiloton yield.
1. – Former Chevron employee disabled their alert system in 22 states.
1. – Hacker breaks into Roosevelt Dam SCADA flood system.
1. – Teenager hacks into NYNEX and cuts off Worcester airport for 6 hour affecting ground and air communications.
1. – Belham Wa. Gasoline pipeline SCADA failure resulting in 3 deaths.
1. – Hackers gain control of GAZPROM natural gas pipeline.
1. – Insider attack on sewage SCADA in Australia results in 1 million gallons of raw sewage being released.
1. – USA Northeast power system blackout believed to be caused by SCADA attack.
1. – CSX train signaling system attacked by Sobig virus.
1. – Auto plants attacked by ZOTOB worm.
1. – Unit 3 Browns Ferry nuclear plant shut down due to Cyber incident.
1. – Insider attacks California canal SCADA system.
1. – Hatch Nuclear Plant emergency shutdown due to Cyber incident.
1. DC Metro crash due to ATP failure – NTSB cites “parasitic oscillations and unintended signal paths”.
1. – Insider attack on US Hospital SCADA system.

Read more: http://securycore.blogspot.com/#ixzz1kMKN4D85

Online scada stuffs

(via seclists)

DoktorVonDoom: OH BOY ANOTHER JUGGERNAUT EPISODE!!! No, wait a minute… I remember...

doktorvondoom:

OH BOY ANOTHER JUGGERNAUT EPISODE!!!
No, wait a minute… I remember this one.
(why is everyone so fucking attractive in this show it’s exhausting)
They make you think he’ll actually break free after the facility malfunctions, but then…
Charles actually…

digsyiscomics:

Dark Avengers v2 #182, December 2012, written by Jeff Parker, penciled by Neil Edwards

ilaney:

ilaney:
So Juggernaut?
Gay. Totally gay.
For real?
Swear to God.
You (maybe) heard it here first, guys.
He’s the Juggernaut and he’s fabulous.
[She-Hulk Vol.4 #28]

deepathirana:

“I’m The Juggernaut, B**ch!”
Sketched with pencil, roughly colored with PS.
Using Marko Djurdjevic’s Juggernaut as a reference! He’s is one of my favorite artists! Love his work!!

xaviersstudent:

Merry early Christmas!
From Generation X #61

towritecomicsonherarms:

wwh vs juggernaut